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Abstract 
The Air Force provides unique capabilities for the defense of our nation. Capabilities do 
not come to fruition instantly; they must go through a development process. Managing 
the development of a capability is a difficult but necessary task. In 2016, a report from 
the Air Force Studies Board prompted the Air Force to focus on the Capability 
Development Process and its improvement. In response to the report, the Strategic 
Development Planning & Experimentation (SDPE) Office was formed. The SDPE Office 
is tasked to support Enterprise Capability Collaboration Teams (ECCTs), which are, in 
turn, tasked to research and solve prominent issues articulated by Air Force leadership. 
To support ECCTs and the Capability Development Council, the SDPE Office must 
manage capability development. This research investigates how other Military Services 
and civilian service sectors handle capability development. The results from this analysis 
will provide the SDPE Office recommendations for managing responsibilities, based on 
the best practices found among the organizations studied. 
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INVESTIGATING CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT FOR THE 
AIR FORCE STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING & 
EXPERIMENTATION (SDPE) OFFICE 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Strategic planning is difficult and time consuming, but necessary (Cohen, 2017). 
A primary strategic goal of the United States Department of Defense (DoD) can be 
summarized in past Deputy Secretary of Defense Work’s words as “maintain[ing] our 
ability to project combat power into any area at the time and place of our own choosing” 
(Work, 2016: par. 39). One way that the DoD achieves this goal, is through funding 
Research and Development (R&D) and capability development (CD). Research and 
Development is defined as “any technologically related activity that has the potential to 
renew or extend present businesses or generate new ones, including core competency 
development, innovation, invention, product development, and process improvement” 
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:1). Capability development is the complete process, from 
concept to “warfighter employment” (Air Force Studies Board, 2016: 96), that a 
capability goes through to be actualized, used by and relevant to the warfighter (Air 
Force Studies Board, 2016: 96). It is “designed to identify opportunities and provide 
solutions to mitigate risk associated with Joint warfighting capability gaps” (Department 
of the Air Force, 2016:21). Although R&D and CD have differences, treating them 
similarly benefits this research by allowing topics, that might have been considered 
irrelevant, into the realm of applicable study. 
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In the Air Force (AF), capability development stems from multiple sources. These 
sources range from top level guidance with documents such as the National Security 
Strategy, the Defense Innovation Initiative, and Air Force Strategic Master Plan, to 
operational and tactical level guidance including warfighter needs, capability gaps, and 
threats (Department of the Air Force, 2016:21-22; Department of Defense, 2014; Insinna, 
2017). These various sources prompt an array of questions for the Air Force to answer 
with respect to capability development. A number of these questions are: What capability 
gaps exist? Which capabilities should be developed? When should a capability be 
developed? What happens if a capability falls through? The Air Force must approach 
capability development carefully, with all of the uncertainty and risk involved, for future 
mission success.  
Capabilities exist within the Core Functions of the Air Force. These 12 Core 
Functions (bulleted list below) were divided among seven Air Force Major Commands 
(MAJCOMs) (bold headings) as seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. Air Force Core Function Assignments 
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A Core Function Lead (CFL) is assigned to each Core Function in a MAJCOM 
(Department of the Air Force, 2015:9). CFL-led MAJCOM Teams look within their areas 
of operation to determine what capabilities already exist and whether existing capabilities 
can fulfill the DoD-mandated Core Function requirements (Department of Defense, 
2010:34; Department of the Air Force, 2011:43-53). Formally, a capability requirement is 
“a capability required to meet an organization’s roles, functions, and missions in current 
or future operations” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015b:GL-5). It “describes the ability to 
accomplish a task or mission, under a specific set of conditions or constraints and to a 
specified minimum standard considered effective and/or acceptable” (“AF 
Requirements,” 2017:slide 9). Certain capability requirements are classified, while others 
are unclassified. Sometimes, an existing MAJCOM capability leaves a projected mission 
requirement unfulfilled. Still, other times, a MAJCOM simply may not have a capability 
required to meet Core Function objectives. The situations described in the previous 
sentences are examples of capability gaps, “the inability to meet or exceed a capability 
requirement, resulting in an associated operational risk until closed or mitigated” (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2015b:GL-5). After a MAJCOM finds a gap, it investigates internal ways 
to develop capabilities and solutions to meet the need. 
At times, capability gaps are found across MAJCOMs and Core Functions (not 
only for one individual Core Function or MAJCOM). To manage these multiple domain 
and multiple Core Function capability gaps and solutions, the Air Force instituted the 
Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE) Office. For the last two 
years, the SDPE Office has worked with Enterprise Capability Collaboration Teams 
(ECCTs) through Experimentation campaigns to find and develop innovative and robust 
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capabilities to fill these capability gaps (Air Force Studies Board, 2016). For clarification, 
the phrase Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation can be separated into 
two parts: (1) Development Planning and (2) Experimentation. Development Planning 
(DP) is “a key process to support the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force in strategic decisions that guide the Air Force toward mission success today 
and in the future, within available funds and with acceptable risk” (Air Force Studies 
Board, 2014: 4). DP concentrates on “pre-acquisition” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:i) 
guidance for Air Force senior leaders in strategic decision making. On the other hand, an 
experiment is “a systematic method for exploring assumptions under controlled 
conditions” (Air Force Studies Board, 2016:8) and an experimentation campaign is “a set 
of experiments intended to address a particular objective” (Air Force Studies Board, 
2016:8). The SDPE Office manages both Development Planning and Experimentation 
across the Air Force.  
The Air Force is not the only branch with a capability development process; other 
Military Services have processes and guidelines for developing capabilities for their 
functions and missions as well. Also, in the civilian sector, many studies on Research and 
Development portfolio management and capability development management have been 
conducted for analysis and improvement of the pursuing organization. Capability 
development is motivated by the DoD objective of ensuring that the nation is able to both 
defend itself and take action when necessary. The 2016 Charter for Air Force Capability 
Development articulates how capability development “includes all activities from 
opportunity or capability gap identification to warfighter employment” (Air Force Studies 
Board, 2016: 96). Ultimately, capability development must be monitored and managed 
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well to ensure that the best and most relevant capabilities are on time and ready for 
warfighter use. 
1.2 Problem  
Since early 2014, there has been an increased focus to address the Capability 
Development Process of the Air Force due to a National Resource Council Air Force 
Studies Board report. One result of this increased focus was the recent (2016) stand up of 
the Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE) Office. The SDPE 
Office is tasked to manage capability development and support ECCTs that research and 
provide solutions to significant issues articulated by Air Force senior leadership. Because 
of the newness of the organization and the limited time to explore external capability 
development management tactics, techniques, and procedures, the SDPE Office reached 
out to Academia for assistance. Thus, this research does two things: (1) investigates how 
other Military Services and a few civilian service sectors handle capability development 
and (2) provides the SDPE Office recommendations for managing responsibilities, based 
on the best practices found among the organizations studied.  
This research problem was developed and formulated through multiple interviews 
with the Sponsor representative. Two interviews with the Sponsor were conducted; one in 
May 2017 and the other in August 2017. These interviews made the research problem 
concrete and revealed the Sponsor’s concerns. The second interview brought clarification 
to the Sponsor’s needs and the thesis was promptly adjusted to adhere to them. Both 
interviews were face-to-face with the student, advisor, and Sponsor representative in 
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attendance. They lasted about an hour each, with questions from the student and advisor 
being addressed by the Sponsor.  
1.3 Justification for research  
Managing the development of capabilities is difficult. What if the capability falls 
through? What if an emerging technology makes the capability obsolete? What if the 
capability takes longer than expected and does not get to the warfighter in time? What is 
Plan B? A few examples of crucial factors an organization must consider when managing 
capability development are deciding which capabilities would be best to invest in, and 
deciding the best time frame to invest. Similarly, questions of which capabilities should 
be shut down or modified need to be answered. The recent (2016) stand up of the 
Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation Office has created a need for 
researching how organizations outside of the Office, approached capability development. 
This research benefits the sponsor by looking at how sister Military Services, foreign 
militaries from a case study, and a few civilian sector organizations manage capability 
development in order to map the best and applicable practices to the Air Force. 
1.4 Scope and Assumptions  
Due to the vast possible sources for investigation, the scope limits the number of 
organizations studied in this research. These organizations include the Air Force, the 
Army, the Navy, foreign Military Services (from a case study), and a few Civilian service 
organizations. For addressing foundational understandings, we make an assumption that 
the current capability development management processes studied in the literature are not 
undergoing major changes due to unknown impending transformational technologies and 
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comparable uncertainties. Also, this research assumes that the mission of the SDPE 
Office will not change dramatically (to where this research becomes obsolete) within the 
timeframe of this research and presentation.   
1.5 Approach  
This research method gathers and analyzes documentation from military and 
civilian publications and articles to provide a solution to the problem statement presented 
in Section 1.2 of the Introduction. Articles were gathered through scholarly search 
engines, such as Google Scholar, the Defense Technical Information Center, and also 
through military publication search engines.  
1.6 Research Questions and Objectives 
The following questions provide the basis for this research: 
Research Question 1: 
How do other Military Services approach capability development management?  
Research Question 2: 
How do organizations from the civilian sector approach R&D portfolio management?  
Research Question 3: 
Are there any capability development management practices from other Military Services 
and civilian sector organizations that could be applied to the SDPE Office? 
1.8 Thesis Preview 
Chapter 2, the Literature Review, first synthesizes literature conveying the 
difficulty of managing capability development. Second, it dives into the background of 
Strategic Planning, Development Planning and Capability Development in the Air Force. 
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Third, it reviews the current capability development process used by the Air Force. 
Finally, it surveys how sister U.S. Military Services, three foreign Military Services, and 
a few civilian sector organizations manage capability development and Research and 
Development. The Analysis and Results section (Chapter 3) summarizes applicable tools 
and techniques for managing capability development and analyzes the overall trends and 
differences found in the research. Finally, the Conclusion (Chapter 4) presents the 
recommendations for the SDPE Office with practical implementation and wraps up the 
research with potential future work. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Challenges in Capability Development and Management  
 The foundation for R&D is uncertainty. There would be no need to research or 
develop capabilities or products if everything was already known and understood 
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:8). The development of a capability is surrounded by 
uncertainty. Changes in the warfighting environment, operational requirements or 
evolving technologies are a few of the uncertainties that affect capability development. 
One difficulty that Jain and Triandis note in their book Management of Research and 
Development Organizations, is deciding when to end a research and development effort 
“that does not seem to be solvable” (Jain and Triandis, 1997:13). Maintaining the 
researcher’s “motivation and curiosity” (Jain and Triandis, 1997:4) is a challenge, but it 
is a source for advancing research and development through “scientific breakthroughs 
and product development” (Jain and Triandis, 1997:4). The unpredictability of 
circumstances and outcomes makes managing capability development a difficult task. 
 It takes time to develop capabilities, sometimes entailing “a decade or longer, 
which is beyond the lifetime of any administration” (Cohen, 2017:5). Keeping on track 
with timelines and deadlines is a challenge, especially with all of the uncertainties and 
risks that come with capability development. Also, if developing a capability requires 
action from multiple organizations, coordination can be a challenge, especially if a 
participating organization does “not have incentives to provide timely information” 
(Parnell and others, 2013:294). Sometimes, an interdependency, such as one capability 
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development project depending on the completion of another, can cause issues (Parnell 
and others, 2013:294). Also, predicting funding for development of a capability can be a 
challenge (Parnell and others, 2013:293).  
 Ultimately, Winthrop’s words summarize the whole situation with capability 
development: “Predicting effectiveness for a technology, which has not yet been 
invented, against an unknown enemy, for an unknown battle, in an unknown environment 
is a daunting task. Yet, it is necessary to plan for an uncertain future” (Winthrop, 1999:3). 
The next section provides a brief history and background of capability development in 
the Air Force and the Department of Defense.  
2.1.2 History and Background of Capability Development in the Air Force and DoD  
 Capability development stems from Strategic Planning, which is difficult because 
predicting the future is based on uncertainty (no human knows what is going to happen in 
the future). Still, Strategic Planning is essential and allows for the achievement of four 
tasks: “allocat [ing] and justify[ing] resources; structur[ing] the force; defin[ing] and 
shap[ing] the service’s mission and even identity; and perhaps most importantly, 
creat[ing] a dialogue about the direction of the service” (Cohen, 2017:2). Cohen’s 
analysis of the development of Strategic Planning in the Air Force covering the time 
frame from the end of the Cold War to the present, presented five lessons as a way 
forward in future Strategic Planning for the Air Force: “understanding the policy 
environment; encouraging ideas from the bottom; starting the strategy from the top; 
keeping the message succinct, substantive, and sharp; and focusing on process as much as 
product” (Cohen, 2017:2, 59-67). The last lesson is evident within the Air Force today 
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through its current Capability Development Process, but the process itself, as shown in 
the following paragraphs, needed development and has been developed over time. 
Development Planning influences the Air Force’s Capability Development 
Process through supporting senior leadership in strategic decision making (Air Force 
Studies Board, 2014:4), affecting which operational capabilities will be required to be 
developed in the long run. In the late 1970s, there was an emphasis on the process of 
Development Planning in the Air Force because General Slay, Commander of Air 
Systems Command at the time, understood and saw “the need for a better system to 
integrate the warfighter, S&T, and acquisition worlds” (Air Force Studies Board, 
2014:15). In response to this need, the Vanguard program was introduced in 1978 and 
one major component was the tool nicknamed “Hooks and Strings” (Air Force Studies 
Board, 2014:14). This tool connected the combat commands, science and technology 
community, and acquisition centers by obtaining answers to questions such as “Do all Air 
Force advanced development (budget category 6.3) projects have a clear and recognized 
trace back to some stated Air force capability, deficiency, or operational requirement?” 
(Air Force Studies Board, 2014:14) and “Can assurance be provided that technology 
work accomplished or under way by the Air Force laboratories is not duplicated in 
contracts issued to defense contractors by Air Force program offices?” (Air Force Studies 
Board, 2014:14). 
  Vanguard had several advantages, many of which resemble how the Air Force 
approaches capability development today. One advantage of Vanguard was how it 
organized planning into three major “areas: (1) mission plans, (2) major force elements, 
and (3) functional plans” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:14). These areas of focus grew 
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broader moving from “specific tasks” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:14) with mission 
plans to broad tasks (functional plans) encompassing multiple missions (Air Force 
Studies Board, 2014:14). Another benefit from the Vanguard program was that an 
essential group of personnel was formed and gathered, and included members from a 
wide spread of fields, specifically intelligence, operations, acquisition, science and 
technology, industry, independent research and development, finance, logistics, and 
analysis, “who, together, identified the gaps, proposed solutions to mitigate the gaps, and 
built capability roadmaps that integrated technology needs and program needs over a 20-
year period” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:3). Finally, mandatory senior leadership 
meetings, that took budget and funding information into consideration, kept all of the Air 
Force domains and MAJCOMs accountable and involved in Development Planning (Air 
Force Studies Board, 2014:15).  
Between the 1980s and the first decade of this century, attention for Development 
Planning (DP) reduced substantially due to a number of issues, including the downsizing 
and reorganization of the Air Force and a decline in funding for Development Planning 
(Air Force Studies Board, 2014:19-20). However, a fundamental analysis paper 
proposing an “operationally oriented process” (Kent, 1989:iii) for Defense planning in 
response to the disagreement between Congress and the defense community on the 
“relationship between U.S. military strategies and the defense budgets” (Kent, 1989:v) 
was published in 1989 by the late Glenn A. Kent. He was a defense policy strategist 
whose influence reached farther than his careers in the Air Force and the Research And 
Development (RAND) corporation alone. His analysis, titled “A Framework for Defense 
Planning” was completed for the Air Force, but is applicable to the other Services and the 
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DoD. His framework suggested the use of a capability hierarchy that “link[ed] strategies 
to tasks and programs” (Kent, 1989:16). In his words, “the approach provides a 
systematic tool for assessing the degree to which tasks are accomplished and operational 
objectives are achieved and for identifying problem areas” (Kent, 1989:16). The 
components of the capability hierarchy ordered from the operational level (low) to the 
strategic level (high) were: operational tasks, operational objectives, regional strategies, 
national military strategy, and finally the national security strategy (Kent, 1989:v-vi). 
Remnants of his “Force planning process” (Kent, 1989:16-18) and “Strategies-to-Tasks 
Process” (Kent, 1989:17-19) are observable in the interaction between the Air Force’s 
current Strategy, Planning and Programming Process (SP3) and Capability Development 
Process.  
Later in 2010, the Air Force Materiel Command Directorate of Intelligence and 
Requirements (AFMC A2/5) expressed the importance of Development Planning by 
publishing a Development Planning Guide (Intelligence, 2010). This guide framed 
Development Planning as an enabler for improving the acquisition process (Intelligence, 
2010). Also, the early definition of Development Planning, represented in this Guide, 
encompassed many factors representative of capability development today, including 
cost, risk and performance assessments and “best practices and processes to ensure 
successful early acquisition planning” (Intelligence, 2010:1). As Development Planning 
went in and out of focus for a few years, its priority in the Air Force was firmly 
recognized in 2014 by the driving report titled: Development Planning: A Strategic 
Approach to Future Air Force Capabilities (Air Force Studies Board, 2014). This report 
was published by the Air Force Studies Board and the National Research Council. It 
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recommended that the current Air Force definition of Development Planning be 
established above all others and increased the awareness and importance of Development 
Planning and capability development across the entire Air Force.  
In all branches of the military, before a capability can be developed, its 
requirement must be validated by senior leadership. After a capability requirement is 
validated, various organizations within a Military Service begin investigating in 
capability solutions. Defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the two major approaches to 
filling capability requirements in the Department of Defense: materiel and non-materiel 
solutions. A materiel solution refers to “correction of a deficiency, satisfaction of a 
capability gap, or incorporation of a new technology that results in the development, 
acquisition, procurement, or fielding of a new item” (emphasis added) (Department of the 
Air Force, 2013:81). On the other hand, a non-materiel solution addresses capability 
development through eight categories distinguished by the following acronym: 
DOTmLPF-P (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015b). The eight categories are designated as 
follows: D – Doctrine, O – Organization, T – Training, m – materiel, L – Leadership and 
Education, P – Personnel, F – Facilities, and P – Policy. Please note that the “m” for 
materiel in the DOTmLPF-P acronym is distinct from the major approach to filling a 
capability requirement described earlier. Although both result as a physical item or 
software, the DOTmLPF-P materiel “is restricted to commercial or non-developmental 
items that may be purchased commercially or by purchasing more systems from an 
existing materiel program” (Department of the Air Force, 2013:82). Also, some 
references in this research distinguish these joint capabilities by using a capital M, 
Materiel, to refer to a new system, and a lower-cased m, materiel, to refer to a 
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commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) system. Unless otherwise noted, the term materiel in 
this research refers to the first definition (not DOTmLPF-P).   
As mentioned above, the DoD handles capability gaps and opportunities through 
two major approaches: non-materiel and materiel. Non-materiel capability solutions 
come about through DOTmLPF-P changes, while materiel capability solutions come 
about through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
process. The following section dives deeper into DOTmLPF-P changes, while the 
subsequent section reviews the JCIDS process.  
Gaining capability through a non-materiel approach is possible by modifying a 
DOTmLPF-P area. The following section provides example scenarios in which capability 
requirements, gaps and opportunities were filled through Joint DOTmLPF-P changes. On 
a side note, the term “joint” in this research refers to a combination of DoD Military 
Services (i.e. does not include other departments in DoD or any external departments). 
Doctrinal change.  
Over time, the Army’s sustainment doctrine contained over 100 manuals for 
topics ranging from field operations to tactics, techniques and procedures. Because of the 
vast amount of sustainment doctrine, soldiers found it hard to digest, keeping them from 
understanding the concepts and applying them where necessary. The capability gap of 
having insufficient awareness of sustainment doctrine in the community was addressed in 
2012, when the Army published the Doctrine 2015 Initiative to consolidate doctrine for 
easier review and continuous updating (Hodge, 2012). Once the doctrine was reduced and 
released, sustainment soldiers gained the capability of quickly and sufficiently digesting 
doctrine in order to apply it when necessary. 
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Organizational change. 
In relation to the rise in cyber attacks around the globe over the years, a capability 
gap of disjoint cyber forces was identified in the DoD. In 2009, the then United States 
Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) to establish 
CYBERCOM (Cyber Command), a joint subcommand, for addressing the capability gap 
of disjoint cyber forces and cyber vulnerabilities (“U.S. Cyber,” 2016). In 2010, 
CYBERCOM was fully operational and the U.S. Department of Defense gained the 
capability of having a unified structure to perform joint military operations (defense and 
offense) in the cyber environment. 
Training change. 
In 2014, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey 
deliberated over the capability requirement for a future “ISR Joint Force” (Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014:ii) in the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Joint Force 2020 White Paper. Accordingly, a capability solution was implemented 
through regular Joint training exercises by the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) in order to solidify joint Service collaboration and preparation 
for deployments. In particular, the USSOCOM Emerald Warrior 17 Training Exercise 
joined DoD conventional and special operations forces to incorporate “ISR Integration” 
(Holochwost, 2017: par. 6) of the MC-12 Aircraft, among other objectives; enhancing the 
ISR Joint Force capability that General Dempsey addressed in the paper mentioned 
earlier.  
Materiel change. 
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In the late 1990s, the Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye Mission Computer platform ran into a 
capability gap that “inhibited the ability to integrate modern, more advanced Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Surveillance (C4IS) weapons 
systems into the aircraft” (“E-2C,” 2004:par. 5). To address the capability gap, the Navy 
worked with Northrop Grumman and developed a “Mission Computer Replacement” that 
used commercial off-the-shelf technology, allowing the aircraft to gain more reliability 
capability.      
Leadership and Education change. 
Officer leadership and education has evolved since the inception of each of the 
U.S. Military Services, but the requirement for educated and skilled leaders in the 
military to execute the President’s orders in defending our nation has not changed (U.S. 
Const. art. II, sec. 3). This capability requirement is filled when various commissioning 
sources, i.e. a U.S. Service Academy, Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), or 
Officer Candidate School (OCS), supply the Military Services with critical thinking 
leaders with every Officer graduate.  
Personnel change. 
The Armed Forces need experienced and skilled military professionals in the 
workplace. Over time, the Department of Defense found a capability gap of losing 
professionals due to various individual life circumstances. In order to combat the loss of 
personnel, the DoD investigated various ways of retaining talent and experience in the 
Military Services, and as a result, the Career Intermission Program (CIP) was piloted in 
2009 (United States Congress, 2008:Sec. 533) and extended to 2019 (United States 
Congress, 2014:Sec. 522). CIP gives each Military Service the capability of retaining a 
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certain amount of talent and technical expertise that would have been lost through 
separation (Navy Military Personnel Plans and Policy Director, 2017).   
Facilities change. 
From the 1940s to 1950s, the Navy built piers to enable ships to dock at bases for 
entry and departure (Cole and Farmer, 2007:1). Rising water levels at Naval bases and 
aging/degrading facilities created the capability requirement for better piers (Parker, 
2017). In order to fulfill the need for upgrading and/or acquiring new piers, the Naval 
Station Norfolk “[chose] to replace its aging piers with double deck piers” (Cole and 
Farmer, 2007:1). These new double deck piers equip the Naval Station Norfolk to have 
the capability to face rising water levels with advanced protection and more efficient 
operations.     
Policy change. 
  Recognition of the capability gap of potential loss of talent, motivated then 
Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James to enact a Policy Memorandum involving 
new accessions into the Air Force in 2017 (Secretary of the Air Force, 2017). It allowed 
waivers on a case by case basis, for previously disqualifying medical matters, such as 
eczema and ADHD. The policy change also relaxed tattoo limits. These changes gave the 
Air Force the capability to “recruit and retain America’s top talent, with the intent of 
ensuring that Air Force policy reflects a logical and evidence-based approach that is 
representative of today’s society while also supporting the AF mission” (Secretary of the 
Air Force, 2017:Attachment). 
 The previous examples demonstrate how the DoD has successfully filled 
capability requirements and gaps through non-materiel solutions. The following 
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paragraphs give a brief overview of how materiel capability requirements and solutions 
are “identif[ied], assess[ed], validat[ed], and prioritize[ed]” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2015b:1) through the JCIDS process. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS) process is the formal procedure used for critically examining a materiel 
capability requirement before it undergoes the DoD Acquisition Process to result in a 
joint materiel capability solution. JCIDS is one of the three processes that make up the 
framework for the DoD Acquisition Process, as seen in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. DoD Acquisition Process Framework (“JCIDS Process Overview,” 2017) 
The other two processes in the DoD Acquisition Process Framework are the Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS) process (not to be confused with the overall DoD Acquisition 
Process) and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process 
(Defense Acquisition Guide, 2017:Ch 1-3.2). As seen in Figure 1, all of these processes 
intertwine and affect each other (Department of Defense, 2017b:5). This framework 
shows how capability development is one of the many parts of an acquisition process.  
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At the beginning of the JCIDS process, capability needs and opportunities are 
identified by various entities including the Military Services, Combatant Commands 
(CCMDs) and Functional Capability Boards (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015a:page A-1). 
Afterward, these operational requirements are assessed, analyzed and compared by 
various tools, such as Capabilities Based Assessments (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015c:page 
C-B-1) and Capability Portfolios (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015c:pages B-1, B-5; 
Department of Defense, 2017a:2). Finally, the capability requirements are routed up 
through various Review Boards to result in a prioritized list of validated capability 
requirements that would best benefit the DoD overall (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015b:1-2). 
Now that the history and background of strategic planning, development planning, and 
capability development in the Air Force and DoD is familiar, the next section expands on 
the current status of capability development in the Air Force.  
2.2 Current Air Force Capability Development Management Methods 
Air Force capability development is organized as “an iterative, need-driven cycle” 
(Department of the Air Force, 2016:21). The needs for capability development are 
products of strategic-level guidance and planning events. These events tackle high-level 
problem areas and future objectives by considering inputs from various Air Force 
“entities,” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:22) including Major Commands 
(MAJCOMs), Headquarters Air Force (HAF), Capability Development Working Group 
(CDWG) and Core Function Leads (CFLs) (Department of the Air Force, 2016:22).  
The Air Force Capability Development Process is shown in Figure 2, which 
depicts how actions and events feed into (illustrated by the arrows) each other. The Air 
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Force Capability Development Process starts by laying out all of the capabilities that are 
currently available, and then aligning them with Air Force Strategy (Step 1). Next, gaps 
and opportunities in capability are identified, and then prioritized (Step 2). Following 
prioritization, the Capability Development Working Group examines all of the 
information gathered about the needs of the Air Force and recommends to Senior leaders 
(Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force), a limited number of 
primary “focus areas” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:23) that impact multiple 
domains of the Air Force (Step 3). Then, Air Force Senior leaders select the areas they 
deem to have greatest precedence (Step 4) and Analysis teams, including Enterprise 
Capability Collaboration Teams (ECCTs), are formed and instituted to tackle and 
mitigate those issues/opportunities (Step 5). After ECCTs/Analysis teams are coalesced, 
“Capability Development Plans and Roadmaps” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:24) 
are created and submitted to Senior leadership for review and approval (Step 6). Once a 
Capability Development Plan (CDP) is approved, “Development Planning and 
Experimentation” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:23) is initiated through “non-
materiel and JCIDS acquisition processes” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:25; 
Directorate, 2017) and Courses of Actions (COAs) are researched, analyzed, developed, 
and tested by the ECCTs/Analysis teams (Step 7). Periodic reviews by the Capability 
Development Council (CDC) and Senior leadership focus on: “ECCT progress” 
(Department of the Air Force, 2016:25) and possible changes to Strategic priorities.  
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The SDPE Office is involved in steps four through seven of the Capability Development 
Process. After senior leaders select the “focus areas” in step four and institute the ECCTs 
in step five, the SDPE Office is notified and begins supporting and managing the ECCT 
and monitoring progress of achieving the goals set forth by senior leadership. In step six, 
the SDPE Office keeps record of the Capability Development Plan(s) for future 
reference. In the final step, the SDPE Office sponsors Experimentation Campaigns and 
keeps records of ECCT research and analysis. Even after the ECCT is decommissioned 
after a year, the SDPE Office is responsible for continuity and expertise of ECCT 
knowledge, documentation, recommendations, etc. Considering all this, the Air Force 
Capability Development Process gives a general overview of how the Air Force currently 
manages capability development and provides a basis for understanding and comparing 
other methods of management.  
A related method for managing capability development is making use of a Value 
Hierarchy Model, a tool found in the Operations Research Decision Analysis (DA) field. 
The following paragraphs briefly summarize Decision Analysis, explain Value Hierarchy 
Models, and lastly describe an Air Force application of Value Hierarchy Models. 
According to Keeney, Decision Analysis is “a philosophy, articulated by a set of logical 
axioms, and a methodology and collection of systematic procedures, based upon those 
axioms, for responsibly analyzing the complexities inherent in decision problems” 
(Keeney, 1982:806). The analysis in DA is meant to “illuminate complexity and provide 
insight” (Keeney, 1982:803). The guiding motivation for Decision Analysis is to 
consistently and continually make better decisions. Oftentimes, an organization’s success 
is based off of its decision-making ability, which involves how it approaches decisions 
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and how it strives to improve decision-making. Typically, as an organization continues 
making better (good and sound) decisions, more successful outcomes (rather than 
unsuccessful) result (Parnell et al., 2013). One method for helping make better decisions 
is Value-Focused Thinking (VFT). 
The Value-Focused Thinking approach to decision making made a large impact in 
the Decision Analysis field. Keeney sums up the difference between VFT and traditional 
Alternative-focused thinking: “Value-focused thinking involves starting at the best and 
working to make it a reality. Alternative-focused thinking is starting with what is readily 
available and taking the best of the lot” (Keeney, 1992:6). In the end, Value-Focused 
Thinking “should lead to better consequences” (Keeney, 1992:viii). One tool used for 
deconstructing complex decisions through VFT for better decision making is the Value 
Hierarchy Model.  
The Value Hierarchy Model was created to help a Decision maker(s) (DM) 
evaluate decision alternatives based off his or her values/criteria/objectives. A Value 
Hierarchy Model is structured in layers that become increasingly detailed moving from 
the decision to be made (first, most broad layer), to the Decision maker’s values 
immediately after, followed by the middle level objectives and criteria, and finally to the 
last level of evaluation measures. An example of a Value Hierarchy that was used to 
analyze a decision to buy the best word processor software (Kirkwood, 1997:15) is 
represented in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Word Processor Decision Value Hierarchy Example (Kirkwood, 1997:15) 
The company utilizing the Value Hierarchy in Figure 3, values both “cost” and 
“suitability for use” (Kirkwood, 1997:15) for deciding which word processor to purchase. 
Each of those values can be further decentralized into various objectives and criteria. 
Finally, the tail ends of the objectives contain reasonable measures for evaluating how 
well the corresponding objective or criteria is met.  
An example of a VFT Value Hierarchy Model used for Air Force capability 
management is found within Winthrop’s thesis titled: Technology Selection for the Air 
Force Research Laboratory Air Vehicles Directorate: An Analysis using Value Focused 
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Thinking (Winthrop, 1999). His Sponsor, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Air 
Vehicles Directorate, was responsible for deciding on technology investments for the 
future. Therefore, Winthrop created a “Technology Selection Model” (a Value Hierarchy 
variant) that integrated and utilized Air Force level values to evaluate various technology 
investment options (Winthrop, 1999:3). Value Hierarchy Models are still used today and 
one containing SDPE and Air Force values, objectives, and evaluation measures could be 
used as a tool to manage capability development. Attention to capability development is 
not only restricted to the Air Force; the Army and the Navy concentrate on capability 
development as well. 
2.3 Capability Development in Sister Military Services  
2.3.1 Army 
TRADOC, one of the Army’s three Commands, stands for Training and Doctrine 
Command. It focuses on “chang[ing] the Army for the Future” (“TRADOC,” 2017) 
through four priorities: Design, Acquire, Build, and Improve as seen in Figure 4. Figure 4 
also displays TRADOC’s Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), which is a 
Core Function Lead that was instituted in 2006 (Department of the Army, 2006b). 
ARCIC supports the Army through concept and capability development, evaluation, and 
integration “across DOTMLPF, functions and formations – to provide Soldiers and units 
the capabilities they need to support Combatant Commanders” (Department of the Army, 
2013:16). ARCIC’s Capabilities Development Directorate is divided into nine divisions 
that focus on perspectives ranging from the “Reliability, Availability and Maintainability 
(RAM) requirements and policy” (“Capabilities Development,” 2018) to the “human 
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dimension ... encompassing the cognitive, physical, and social components to optimize 
the performance of Soldiers, leaders, and teams” (“Capabilities Development,” 2018; 
Department of the Army, 2006a:6). These divisions and directorates support the 
Combined Arms Center’s (CAC) Centers of Excellence (CoEs) (Department of the 
Army, 2013:138). These CoEs are divided by the Army’s functional areas, such as Fires, 
Maneuver, and Cyber, as seen in Figure 4.   
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The Army manages capability development in three phases: (1) Concept 
Development, (2) Capabilities Determination, and (3) Capabilities Integration 
(Department of the Army, 2013:9-12). As a brief introduction, concepts were 
contemplated in 1979 by then Army TRADOC Commander, General Donn A. Starry in 
his Commander’s Notes Number 3 titled, “Operational Concepts and Doctrine” (Army 
Commanding General, 1979). The Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance for Developing and 
Implementing Joint Concepts specifies that a joint concept “identifies a current or future 
military challenge and proposes a solution to improve the joint force’s ability to address 
that military challenge. A joint concept may also propose new ways to employ the joint 
force based on future technology” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:GL-4). Taking both of the 
previous references into consideration, the Army recognizes that concepts define four 
areas: “how the force functions (operational concept), the timeframe and conditions it 
must be able to operate in (the OE), its physical and organizational characteristics (design 
parameters and architecture), and what it must be able to execute (required capabilities) 
in terms of performing missions or producing effects” (Department of the Army, 
2013:33). The development of concepts in the Army is based off of the Joint Concept 
Development Process. This process is part of the Joint Concept Life Cycle, as seen in 
Figure 5. The Joint Concept Development Process starts with “identify[ing] future 
military challenges” and ends with “concept approval” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:A-6). 
Note that a Joint Concept General Officer Steering Committee (JC GOSC) is responsible 
for “guidance and oversight of the JCD [Joint Concept Development] Program” (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2016:D-3). 
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Figure 5. Joint Concept Life Cycle (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:A-6) 
One of the things that the Army Concept Framework (ACF) identifies and 
produces is required capabilities. The ACF organizes concepts into four sections: (1) the 
Army Capstone Concept (ACC), (2) the Army Operating Concept (AOC), (3) Army 
Functional Concepts (AFC), and (4) advisory documents (i.e. “white papers and concept 
of operations (CONOPS) papers” (Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014:9)). The 
amount of detail describing concepts increases as one moves from the Army Capstone 
Concept (section 1) of the ACF, to the Army Functional Concepts (section 4). The Army 
Capstone Concept gives a general overview of “how the future Army, as part of the joint 
force, will operate across the range of military operations” (Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, 2014:8). The Army Capstone Concept guides the Army Operating Concept 
and both, in turn, guide the Army Functional Concepts. Required capabilities are detailed 
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enough in the Army Functional Concepts, that Capabilities Based Assessments (CBAs) 
can be created from them (Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014:8-9). A CBA is 
defined as “an analytic process that identifies capability requirements and associated 
capability gaps” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:GL-3). The Army Concept Framework and 
the Army Concept Development Process are embedded in the “Concept” portion of the 
Army’s Concept to Solutions Roadmap, displayed in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. Army Concept to Solutions Roadmap (Army Training and Doctrine Command, 
2014:10) 
The Army’s capability development management phases of Concept 
Development, Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration are embedded in 
the Army Concept to Solutions Roadmap. In the Army’s Concept to Solutions Roadmap, 
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concepts are based on problems/challenges that come up due to a number of reasons, 
such as changes in the Operational Environment, weaknesses in current capabilities, or 
changes in strategy directed by higher level leadership (Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, 2014:10). The drafted concepts address the problems. Afterward the concepts 
are evaluated during the “Analysis” phase to ensure that the concepts themselves, and the 
associated capabilities are qualified for further development (concept development). 
Finally, once the “concept-required capabilities” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016:A-3) are 
determined (capabilities determination), they are integrated “to merge, de-conflict, and 
synchronize functional, organizational, and DOTMLPF capability requirements and 
solutions to unify and improve warfighting capabilities” (Department of the Army, 
2013:41) (capabilities integration). The next section investigates how the Navy manages 
and organizes capability development and integration.  
2.3.2 Navy 
The Department of the Navy is organized into three overarching areas: Executive, 
Shore Establishment and Operating Forces (“United States Government Manual,” 
2017:Department of the Navy). Each of these areas has entities that contribute to 
developing and integrating capabilities for the Navy. For the Executive area, the Office of 
Naval Research (ONR) researches, provides, and manages capabilities for the Navy. The 
Navy’s Shore Establishment contains several Systems support components for the Navy’s 
Operating forces (referred to as the “Fleet”), as highlighted in the Shore Establishment 
row in Figure 7.  
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Four of the Systems Commands of the Navy’s Shore Establishment provide and manage 
significant capabilities pertaining to: Naval Sea Systems, Naval Air Systems, Space and 
Naval Warfare Systems, and Strategic Systems (“United States Government Manual,” 
2017:Department of the Navy). Also, the Naval Warfare Development Command and 
Navy Warfighting Development Centers directly support the Operating Forces 
(Department of the Navy, 2018), as seen in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8. Navy Development Command and Centers 
The Navy Warfighting Development Centers (WDC) were established within the last five 
years at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations (Deboer, 2017:par. 9; “Wanted,” 
2017:6). They support the Navy Fleet by integrating their individual warfighting Focus 
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Areas (information, undersea, expeditionary, aviation, and surface and mine) “into Naval 
warfighting” (Deboer, 2017:par. 11). Each WDC engages in four lines of operation: (1) 
“enhancing advanced level training” (Deboer, 2017:par.6), (2) “development of doctrine” 
(Deboer, 2017:par. 7), (3) “cultivat[ing] and develop[ing] … subject matter expertise” 
(Deboer, 2017:par. 8), and (4) assessing the organization’s three other lines of operation 
and its other capabilities for improvement (Deboer, 2017:par. 9).  
 The Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) was established in 1998 
(Navy Warfare, 2017b:par. 8) and it is currently responsible for the development and 
integration of “innovative solutions to complex naval warfare challenges to enhance 
current and future warfighting capabilities” (“The NWDC Mission,” 2018) across the 
Navy, similar to the Air Force’s Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation 
Office’s role. It carries out its duties through heading the Navy Capability Generation and 
Concept Development Program (Department of the Navy, 2014:9) and conducting “a 
variety of forums including flag level summits, tactical and operational level war games, 
and fleet experimentation initiatives that bring together all the WDCs in order to get at 
fully integrated, all-domain solutions” (Navy Warfare, 2017a:par. 3). The seven areas of 
responsibility for NWDC are: Concepts, Concept of Operations (CONOPS), 
Experimentation, Doctrine, Lessons Learned, Wargaming, and Modeling & Simulation 
(“Products and Services,” 2018).  
One finding from the previous sections of research on Navy structure was that it 
grouped capability development into significant Focus Areas (Sea Systems, Air Systems, 
Information Warfighting, Expeditionary Warfighting, etc.) and then assigned 
organizations to each Focus Area. Then, some of the organizations were held responsible 
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for managing capability development through an inner office, center, or structure. For 
example, the “Air Systems” Focus Area is led by the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR), which has assigned two noticeable capability development management 
branches, namely, Research & Engineering and Test & Evaluation (“NAVAIR 
Overview," 2017), as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Naval Air Systems Command Structure (“NAVAIR Overview," 2017) 
 Another way that the Navy manages capability development is through senior 
level review boards. In 2008, the Department of the Navy established two authoritative 
Capability Boards: the Resources and Requirements Review Board (R3B) and the Naval 
Capabilities Board (NCB). The 3-Star General level R3B is the ultimate decision 
authority on “Navy capability requirements” (Department of the Navy, 2008b:1), while 
the NCB manages capability development one level below the Resources and 
Requirements Review Board “by reviewing and making decisions on Navy requirement 
and resource issues” (Department of the Navy, 2008a:1). Two key members of the 
Resources and Requirements Review Board who have capability development 
management responsibilities are the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of 
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Capabilities and Resources (CNO N8) and the Principal Deputy Assisant Secretary of the 
Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) (PDASN (RD&A)) (Department of the 
Navy, 2008b:2). These two individuals play an important role in the Naval Capability 
Development Process and their positions provide more understanding of how the Navy 
structures capability development. 
Capability development “decision making authorit[y]” (Department of the Navy, 
2008b:Encl. 1) is divided between the two Boards based off of DoD Program Acquisition 
Categories (ACATs) and other classifications. As a brief introduction to ACATs, an 
Acquisition Program is defined as “a directed, funded effort that provides a new, 
improved, or continuing materiel, weapon or information system, or service capability in 
response to an approved need” (Department of Defense, 2007:2). The DoD organizes 
Acquisition Programs into categories (ACATs) that are primarily designated by 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) thresholds and Total 
Procurement thresholds, as seen in Table 2. 
Table 2. ACAT Categories and Thresholds (adapted from DoDI 5000.02, Table 1) 
 
In the Navy, the Resources and Requirements Review Board is assigned as the “decision 
making authorit[y]” (Department of the Navy, 2008a:Encl 1) for ACAT I programs that 
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have the Joint Requirement Oversight Council’s (JROC) special attention, while the 
Naval Capabilities Board is responsible for ACAT II programs with “non JROC interest” 
(Department of the Navy, 2008a:Encl 1). Both the R3B and NCB being involved in the 
Capability Development Process of the Navy, supports evidence of more of the Navy’s 
structure for managing capability development and integration.  
 The Naval Capabilities Development Process (NCDP) capitalizes on Capabilities 
Based Assessments (Department of the Navy, 2011:page 1-5) and is summarized in 
Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. NCDP (adapted from SECNAVINST 5000.2, page 1-5) 
The Naval Capabilities Development Process takes guidance from strategy and 
warfighter concepts to produce the Integrated Capabilities Plan (ICP) (Department of the 
Navy, 2011:page 1-5). The ICP is a portfolio of all of the Navy’s capability investments 
and “serves as the Navy’s ‘warfare investment strategy’ for programming operational 
capabilities” (Department of the Navy, 2011:page 1-5). While the Integrated Capabilities 
Plan is being formed, organizations who will be sponsoring resources for a capability are 
managing finances through “programming and analysis” (Department of the Navy, 
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2011:page 1-5). Both the Integrated Capabilities Plan and the resource sponsor’s 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution activities are used to form the 
Sponsor Program Proposal (SPP). The SPP delineates the Systems that corresponding 
operational capabilities (listed in the ICP) are contingent upon for functionality. For 
clarification, an example of the dependent relationship between a System and a capability 
can be seen with the “Duplexer” Naval Radar System. Before this System was made 
available, an individual antenna was capable of either only transmitting or only receiving 
data. The “Duplexer” System activated the capability of both “transmitting and 
receiving” (“Naval Radar Systems,” 2018) data through one antenna. Moving back to the 
Naval Capabilities Development Process, after a System is validated through the Sponsor 
Program Proposal, it is acquired through the DoD Acquisition Process, ultimately 
resulting in a capability being put into the hands of the warfighter (Department of the 
Navy, 2011:page 1-5). The next section reviews how a few civilian sector organizations 
and foreign militaries approached capability development management.  
2.4 Civilian R&D and Foreign Military Capability Development Management  
The primary motivations to develop capabilities, found in the literature for this 
section, were national defense (Lee and Yoon, 2015:1309-1310), market competition 
(Kolk and Rungi, 2012:6), and organization/personal improvement (Matheson and 
Matheson, 2016; Covey, 2004). For the national defense motivation, Lee and Yoon 
compare the development of three foreign military aircraft industries. Each aircraft 
industry development process involved four key factors: (1) “international technology 
transfer agreements” (Lee and Yoon, 2015:1296), (2) the “technology acquisition mode” 
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(Lee and Yoon, 2015:1297), which referred to the initial emphasis of either making or 
buying aircraft at the start of the industry, (3) the “role of foreign partners” (Lee and 
Yoon, 2015:1296) either actively or passively engaging with the respective developing 
aircraft industry, and (4) government “industrial policy initiatives” (Lee and Yoon, 
2015:1299) in support of Research and Development. An aircraft industry gained further 
development as factors one, three, and four improved. Currently, South Korea, China and 
Brazil have an improved military capability of national defense due to the development 
of each respective aircraft industry.   
 For the market competition motivation, Kolk and Rungi studied and assessed how 
four major “information and communication technology (ICT)” (Kolk and Rungi, 
2012:6) companies developed capabilities in relation to market partnerships. They 
categorized ICT capabilities into four areas: Transformative, Intrinsic, Directions, and 
Combinative (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:12-13). Transformative and Intrinsic Capabilities 
sided on “exploitive” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:5) activities, while Directions and 
Combinative Capabilities sided on “explorative” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:7) activities. In 
organizational learning theory, exploitation deals with “practicing activities” (Kolk and 
Rungi, 2012:7) while exploration deals with “learning activities” (Kolk and Rungi, 
2012:7). After analyzing market evolvement information on each ICT company, Kolk 
and Rungi found that overall, the majority of capability focus was on exploitive activities 
(Kolk and Rungi, 2012:15-16). They also confirmed that all of the companies exhibited 
“open” partnerships (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:12). “Open” partnerships meant a company 
displayed a minimal number of repeated alliances with other firms and more alliances 
with firms outside of their Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) business fields (Kolk 
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and Rungi, 2012:10). Kolk and Rungi’s organization of Google, Ericcson, Microsoft, and 
Nokia’s capabilities, to study the development in respect to “market emergence, market 
take-off, and market growth” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:14), provide “best practices in 
capability development that other companies could follow to achieve similar results and 
benefits” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:6). Their conclusion that “exploitation prevails over 
exploration” (Kolk and Rungi, 2012:18) conflicts with the Department of Defense’s 
emphasis on the need for innovation and exploration in the Services.   
 For the organization/personal improvement motivation, Covey focuses on 
improving an individual’s personal effectiveness based on “universal, timeless, self-
evident principles common to every enduring, prospering society throughout history” 
(Covey, 2004:7), and Matheson and Matheson argue that enhancing decision making 
brings improvement and success to an organization. In order to develop the capability of 
being personally effective, Covey expounds on seven achievable habits, each based on a 
“principle or natural law that governs the results you seek” (Covey, 2004:7). These habits 
and corresponding principles are organized in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11. Covey’s Seven Habits and Principles (Covey, 2004) 
Understanding and instilling “realities” (Covey, 2004:24) and principles and working to 
develop and achieve the seven habits, brings personal improvement and effectiveness.  
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 Matheson and Matheson agree that “smart” decision making will both orient and 
keep an organization on the path to success. In the 1990s, they conducted a study of how 
hundreds of companies (ranging from industrial chemicals and petroleum products to 
electronic equipment and aerospace/defense) managed research and development (R&D) 
decision making (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:65-6). After interviews and 
questionnaire exchanges with the companies, Matheson’s Strategic Decision Group 
compiled, identified, and developed a list of best practices for decision making 
(enumerated in Section 3.2.1) (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:70-73). By working to 
make these best practices a reality, an organization improves its R&D decision making, 
which in turn, improves the organization itself.   
 Although the motivation for developing capabilities was different for all of the 
studies in this section of the research, evidence of structure and management being 
necessary for each capability development process was the same. This necessity prompts 
the search for practices that would benefit the SDPE Office’s management of 
responsibilities.  
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III. Analysis and Results 
3.1 Introduction 
 This section explores the tools and techniques that were chosen to be applied to 
the Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation Office’s scenario of managing 
their responsibilities and capability development. It also examines trends and differences 
found among the Air Force, Army, and Navy.   
3.2 Applicable Tools, Techniques 
 The following sections describe tools and techniques found in the literature that 
have applicable use for the SDPE Office. First, their original application and setting are 
described. Second, the application to the SDPE Office is described for future adaptation 
or consideration.  
3.2.1 Span of Control diagram with Best practices  
In The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, Covey categorizes problems of life 
into three encompassing areas: Circle of Influence, Circle of Concern, and then No 
Concern. The Circle of Influence is inside the Circle of Concern, while No Concern is 
placed outside the Circles. He specifies these Circles further into four areas: Direct 
Control, Indirect Control, No Control, and No Concern (Covey, 2004:85-86). An 
example of an area in which one has direct control over is one’s own behavior. Those 
problems that we have influence over but do not directly control, often “[involve] other 
people’s behavior” (Covey, 2004:85). The areas of Concern in our lives that we have no 
control over, cover issues “we can do nothing about, such as our past or situational 
realities” (Covey, 2004:85). Finally, there are problems in life that do not concern us at 
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all. As one works in the area of Direct Control, one’s Circle of Influence expands in the 
Circle of Concern. Covey’s organizational structure of life problems for personal use, can 
be used to organize the SDPE Office’s responsibilities for managing capability 
development. For this research, Covey’s areas are slightly adapted into the categories of 
Control, Direct Influence, and Indirect Influence, as shown in the SDPE Office Span of 
Control Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12. SDPE Office Span of Control (adapted from Covey’s Circles of Concern and 
Influence using material from AFGM 2016-90-1101) 
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The first category under the SDPE Office’s span of control is the Circle of 
Control. The SDPE Office has primary responsibility of the major tasks listed in its 
Circle of Control. The second category is the Circle of Direct Influence. In this category, 
the SDPE Office’s responsibilities have a straightforward impact on how an outside 
organization does its job. For example, the SDPE Office’s responsibility of coordinating 
ECCT updates and recommending actions to Senior Leadership (Department of the Air 
Force, 2016:6; Air Force Studies Board, 2016:94) directly affects the CDC’s 
responsibility of establishing ECCTs (Air Force Studies Board, 2016:93). The final 
category under the SDPE’s span of control is the Circle of Indirect Influence. The SDPE 
has indirect influence, and vice versa, on responsibilities listed in this last category. For 
example, when one responsibility has a direct influence on another responsibility, that has 
a direct influence on a third responsibility, then, the first responsibility has an indirect 
influence on the third responsibility. This can be seen with the SDPE’s responsibility of 
Sponsoring and overseeing experimentation (Air Force Studies Board, 2016:93) having 
an indirect impact on the CDWG’s responsibility of recommending the prioritization of 
capability gaps, strategic opportunities, and CD activities to the CDC (Air Force Studies 
Board, 2016:94). In this example, the link between the two responsibilities is the 
CDWG’s responsibility of reviewing and assessing the progress of Air Force CD (Air 
Force Studies Board, 2016:94). The only way that the Capability Development Working 
Group ensures credibility of its prioritized recommendations to the CDC is by reviewing 
and assessing the progress of CD across the Air Force (Air Force Studies Board, 
2016:94) (a responsibility that the SDPE Office has direct influence over through 
involvement with ECCTs, wargaming and Experimentation Campaigns). If the SDPE 
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Office uses and adds to this Span of Control diagram, it will maintain situational 
awareness. Also, if it keeps track of the progress of all of the responsibilities placed in 
each of the circles of control, it will be able to adjust and improve its responsibilities (1) 
as a response to outside changing factors and (2) as a motivation to influence outside 
organizations for efficiency and improvement.  
Integrating high quality decision making into capability development 
management will undoubtedly enhance the SDPE Office’s effectiveness in implementing 
their responsibilities. This research proposes integrating high quality decision making 
through applying a select number of best practices compiled by Matheson and Matheson 
to the Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation Office. Matheson and 
Matheson compiled a set of 45 best practices for “diagnosing and managing R&D 
decision making” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:68). These best practices were grouped 
into nine component areas: 1. Decision basis, 2. Technology Strategy, 3. Portfolio 
Management, 4. Project Strategy, 5. Organization and Process, 6. Relationship with 
internal customer, 7. Relationship with external customer, 8. R&D culture and values, 
and 9. Improving decision quality, which were further combined into three emphasis 
areas: Making quality decisions, Organizing for decision quality and Improving decision 
quality, as shown in Figure 13 (The “Improving decision quality” area is included as both 
a component and emphasis area).  
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After considering the Circles of Control for the SDPE Office, seven of the 45 
practices were chosen for the Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation 
Office to adapt for enhanced decision making, and are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Applicable Decision-making Practices for SDPE Office 
 
By working on the practices listed under the components Decision basis and Project 
strategy, the SDPE Office will reinforce “making quality decisions” (Matheson and 
Matheson, 2016:68). Similarly, developing and regularly implementing those practices 
listed in the third column of Table 3 will aid the SDPE Office in improving future 
decision making quality (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:70).  
If Best Practices PS-3 and IQ-3 were applied while the SDPE Office built and 
maintained ECCT tools, infrastructure, and corporate knowledge (Department of the Air 
Force, 2016:24), the SDPE Office would (1) “create value” (Matheson and Matheson, 
2016:71) for the organization and (2) “create frameworks for learning” (Matheson and 
Matheson, 2016:71). The latter result allows for more steady personnel changeovers, 
especially since the Armed Forces frequently relocate around the globe. If the SDPE 
Office “quantif[ied] decision inputs” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71) and “agree[d] 
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on clear, measurable goals” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71) while coordinating 
ECCT updates and recommending actions to the CDC (Department of the Air Force, 
2016:6; Air Force Studies Board, 2016:94), it would be able to consistently and 
quantifiably track those updates and actions. Another responsibility the SDPE Office 
must take on is deciding on what guidance is appropriate to provide to the ECCTs 
(Department of the Air Force, 2016:6). If the basis of the SDPE Office’s decision 
“ensures credible, consistent inputs” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71), then the 
guidance is confirmed to be trustworthy and reliable. Finally, after an ECCT is 
decommissioned, if the SDPE Office “learn[s] from post-project audits” (Matheson and 
Matheson, 2016:71) and “learn[s] from others worldwide” (Matheson and Matheson, 
2016:71), it will improve the quality of its future decision making with respect to 
“maintain[ing] the expertise needed to support ECCTs, CCTs, and experimentation 
campaigns” (Department of the Air Force, 2016:24).  
Other best practices were not selected for a number of reasons: they were out of 
the SDPE Office’s control, they were another Organization’s responsibility, they were 
not applicable to the SDPE Office, or they were already listed in the SDPE’s 
responsibilities. For instance, the fourth Organization and Process best practice (OP-4) of 
“us[ing] market incentives” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71) was not applicable to the 
SDPE Office, since being a part of a serving organization contradicts the idea of 
considering market involvement. A different best practice, namely, “maintain[ing] 
connections with research organizations” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71) is an 
example of an existent SDPE responsibility (hence the omission from the selected 
applicable best practices). Finally, an example of a best practice that was not included 
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because it was another organization’s responsibility is “PS-1: Fully resource projects” 
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:71). Another applicable tool this research suggests that 
the SDPE Office implement is Matheson and Matheson’s Project Portfolio Matrix.   
3.2.2 Capability Portfolio Matrix 
Matheson and Matheson developed a Research and Development (R&D) “project 
portfolio matrix” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203) aimed at balancing “risk and 
return” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:202). Their R&D portfolio management matrix is 
reproduced in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. The R&D Grid: Project Portfolio Matrix (Matheson and Matheson, 1998:203 
(Fig. 10-2)) 
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The top left quadrant of the Capability Portfolio Matrix contains Bread-and-butter 
projects, which maintain commercial competitiveness by improving existing projects that 
are producing “regular results” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203). These projects are 
geared toward gaining incremental, near-term advantage. They have advanced enough to 
overcome most, if not all, “hurdles (technical, financial, regulatory, etc.)” (Matheson and 
Matheson, 2016:202). An example of a Bread-and butter project is “upgraded software 
tools with new features and ease of use” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:204). This 
project brings more efficiency to what is already available and in use (existing software). 
Oysters are highly innovative and “early stage projects” (Matheson and Matheson, 
2016:204) that give the organization the potential to gain “strategic advantage” 
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203). These projects are “shifters” that move to other 
quadrants as uncertainties about “technical feasibility” and “commercial potential” 
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203) decrease. An example of an oyster project that 
demonstrates the potential for having a major impact in the medical field is a “new 
approach to pain control” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:204). Pearls emerge from 
oysters that have advanced in technical feasibility. To find a pearl, an organization must 
inspect and investigate numerous oysters (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:204). Finally, 
White elephant projects provide minimal value to an organization and end up 
squandering resources that could be used for any other type of project. These projects 
usually start out as Oyster or Bread-and-butter projects with the potential to bring value 
to the organization, but because of “technical defects” (Matheson and Matheson, 
2016:205) or market environment changes, they end up being more of a burden.  
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For future work, modifying this portfolio matrix by substituting a “military value” 
measure for the “commercial value” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203) measure, 
allows it to be used by the SDPE Office for categorizing its capability development 
projects or responsibilities.  
 After projects have been categorized into one of the four quadrants of the Project 
Portfolio Matrix, Matheson and Matheson suggest managing each quadrant separately. 
White elephant projects that have been identified, must be analyzed as soon as possible to 
decide whether they can and should be redirected (to Bread-and-butter or Oyster Project) 
or terminated (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:207). Bread-and-butter projects should be 
rewarded based on “results and conformance to goals” (Matheson and Matheson, 
2016:206), while Oysters should not. Since most Oysters are bound to fail, the 
organization should focus on investigating whether or not the “technical hurdles” 
(Matheson and Matheson, 2016:206) are surmountable. If so, the project shifts to become 
a Pearl; if not, the project is terminated. Pearls are not meant to be measured by “short-
term deliverables” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:206), and should therefore be 
“managed to encourage entrepreneurship” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:206) and 
encourage “value creation” (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:206).    
 If the SDPE Office categorized their capability development responsibilities 
according to these Project Portfolio quadrants, it could then obtain insight and a general 
overview of which areas received more (or less) attention (Matheson and Matheson, 
2016:206-207). Afterward, it would need to address each quadrant according to the 
management methods described in the previous paragraph (Matheson and Matheson, 
2016:206-207). Finally, working to achieve an approximate balance of 90% Bread-and-
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butter and Pearl Projects with 5-10% Oyster Projects (minimizing White Elephant 
projects as much as possible) would provide the opportunity to explore innovative 
projects and balance risk at the same time (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:202).  
3.3 Trends and Differences 
 Each Military Service has designed a structure for managing capability 
development, as summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. Military Service Capability Development Management Comparison 
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Every one of the Services have multiple management levels of capability development 
and integration. In the Air Force, the Strategic Development Planning and 
Experimentation (SDPE) Office was placed under Air Force Materiel Command, under 
the Air Force Research Laboratory. The Capability Development Working Group and the 
SDPE Office have direct access to the Capability Development Council (CDC), which 
has direct access to Air Force senior leadership. In the Navy, capability development and 
integration management were distributed to one Warfare Command and several 
Warfighting Centers. These Warfighting Centers are subordinate organizations placed 
under the Naval Fleet to directly support the Operating Forces by the different Naval 
Focus Areas. The Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) is responsible for 
developing and integrating capabilities across the Navy enterprise and performs its 
mission through gathering the Warfighting Development Centers (WDC) and all domains 
of the Navy for activities such as experimentation campaigns and warfighting games. 
Both the NWDC and the WDCs have direct access to the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO). In the Army, the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) was placed 
under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which has direct access to Army 
headquarters. The ARCIC Capabilities Development Directorate supports the Centers of 
Excellence (CoE) found under the Combined Arms Command (CAC). These CoEs were 
divided by Army Functions such as Mission Command, Intelligence, and Sustainment.   
 The Army and Navy have multiple mid-level Capability Development and 
Integration organizations, while the Air Force has one, the SDPE Office. This result 
makes sense since the Air Force is smaller, in comparison, than each of the other Military 
Services, but if the Air Force followed either of their structures, it could be beneficial. 
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Also, both the Army and the Navy have capability development organizations that are 
assigned to key Service-related Functional Areas, while the Air Force has individuals 
(Core Function Leads) as liaisons between the operating environment and leadership. 
Assigning a team devoted to tackling each Air Force Core Function may prove valuable. 
Ultimately, the Air Force has a good start for managing capability development and 
integration, especially with the recent (within the last three years) stand up of related 
organizations. As it continues to advance in capability development management, the Air 
Force can find useful guidance from reviewing the other Military Service’s methods for 
managing capability development and integration.    
 One similarity found among all of the Military Services was the importance of 
“pre-acquisition” (Air Force Studies Board, 2014:i) strategy development. This 
importance is apparent through the Navy’s Concept Generation and Concept 
Development (CGCD) Program, the Army Capabilities Integration Center’s Concept 
Development and Learning Directorate, and the Air Force’s Development Planning 
initiatives. 
 One distinct difference between the Services was how similar words and phrases, 
such as “capability development” or “capabilities development,” had different meanings. 
For example, the Army expresses “capabilities development” as a synonym for 
“capabilities determination.” Both of these are defined as “the Army’s implementation of 
the JCIDS process used to identify, assess, and document changes in DOTMLPF that 
collectively produce the force capabilities and attributes prescribed in approved concepts, 
CONOPS, or other authoritative sources” (Department of the Army, 2013:37). Thus, in 
some respect, it seems that the Army uses this term specifically for JCIDS activities, 
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while the Air Force uses it to encompass not only JCIDS activities, but DOTmLP-F 
activities as well.  
An interesting difference between the Army and the Navy is the echelon 
determination for capability development organizations. The structure for Army 
capability development from top to bottom is as follows: Army TRADOC Command, 
Army Capabilities Integration Center, Army Capability Development and Integration 
Directorate, and ARCIC Divisions (Focus Areas). For the Navy, the capability 
development chain of commands starts with the Office of Naval Operations and branches 
out to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities 
and Resources (CNO N8), four major Naval Systems Commands, the Naval Warfare 
Development Command and five Navy Warfighting Development Centers. Each of the 
Systems Commands and Navy Warfighting Centers have subdivisions that tackle 
capability development and integration. The Army’s approach to managing capability 
development emphasizes capability development first, and then spreads that to specific 
Army Functional Focus Areas, while one of the Navy’s approaches starts with Functional 
Focus Areas and allows each Focus Area (Systems Command, Warfighting Development 
Centers) to manage capability development and integration individually. 
 The studies by the civilian sector organizations gave best practices and lessons 
learned for managing problems, capabilities, and projects. Although each of the 
categories managed was different, the management methods explored in these studies 
provided insight and application for the SDPE Office to investigate and possibly adapt 
these methods.  
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IV. Conclusion 
4.1 Research Questions and Findings 
 The Research questions and findings are as follows: 
Research Question 1: 
How do other Military Services approach capability development management?  
Research Findings: 
The Army organizes capability development through a structural multi-level hierarchy 
with the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) as the head and Capability 
Development Integration Directorates (CDIDs) as the extensions. The CDIDs work with 
the Combined Arms Center’s Functional Centers of Excellence (CoEs) to address 
capability development and integration in the Army. 
The Navy has three entities that focus on capability development and integration. The 
Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) is responsible for integrating 
capabilities across Navy functions and domains, while the Navy Warfighting 
Development Centers (WDCs) address capabilities categorized by warfighting functions 
(for example, Surface and Mine warfighting and Undersea warfighting) in direct support 
of the Fleet. Finally, the Naval Systems Commands have subdivisions which are 
responsible for addressing capability development and integration according to the Naval 
Systems category (i.e. Sea Systems, Air Systems, Space and Naval Warfare Systems, and 
Strategic Systems).  
 
Research Question 2: 
57 
How do organizations from the civilian sector approach R&D portfolio management?  
Research Findings: 
Matheson and Matheson’s Project Portfolio matrix used measures of technical feasibility 
and commercial potential (Matheson and Matheson, 2016:203) to evaluate Research and 
Development projects, while Covey’s Span of Control chart classified responsibilities 
into Control and Influence categories that allowed for tracking the status of all tasks for 
organization efficiency and improvement. 
 
Research Question 3: 
Are there any capability development management practices from other Military Services 
and civilian sector organizations that could be applied to the SDPE Office? 
Research Findings: 
The Army and Navy’s organizational practice of structuring capability development 
management with a few “lead” commands and multiple operational-level centers and 
divisions could be adapted in the Strategic Development and Planning Experimentation 
Office and the Air Force.  
Covey’s Span of Control chart can be applied to the SDPE Office for categorizing and 
tracking its capability development management responsibilities. 
Matheson and Matheson’s Capability Portfolio Matrix can also be useful to the SDPE 
Office for project categorization and tracking. 
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4.2 Recommendations 
It is recommended that the Air Force considers the Army or Navy’s capability 
development management structure as it continues structuring its own capability 
development forces. Also, this research recommends that the SDPE Office implement the 
capability development management tools from Section 3.2 for one year, to figure out 
which practices and tools produce the best results. Additionally, after one year of using a 
management tool, documenting an After Action Reports (AAR), evaluation, or lessons 
learned is suggested for future research. Furthermore, this research seeks to bring the 
SDPE Office awareness of the trends and differences found in Section 3 of the Results 
and Analysis Chapter (Chapter 3).  
4.3 Future Work/Research 
 After digging into this research, opportunities for future work emerged. One of 
these opportunities is conducting a longitudinal study of an Air Force Program that is 
currently in use by the warfighter in the field. Investigating an Air Force Program from 
birth to acquisition would provide much insight into the Air Force’s capability 
development and integration process. Working with the Air Force Materiel Command’s 
Air Force Life Cycle Management Center would be beneficial for this longitudinal study.  
 Another opportunity for future work is creating a Multiple Objective Decision 
Analysis Value Hierarchy in relation to this research’s suggestion, in Section 4.2.2, of 
modifying Matheson and Matheson’s Portfolio Matrix to be relevant to the Strategic 
Development Planning and Experimentation Office. Figuring out what the SDPE Office 
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considers “military value” and using those to find evaluation measures might prove 
useful.  
 Additionally, after the suggested one year implementation of using the capability 
development management tools from Section 4.2, the SDPE Office can reevaluate its 
capability development management responsibilities and ask Academia for an updated 
Literature Review or additional research for improving management. However, even 
before the year is up, another Literature Review and Analysis is recommended due to this 
research’s scope and limitations. 
 If additional time was available, the research team would attempt to contact the 
various military organizations for a capability development point of contact for further 
understanding of how each Service manages capability development and integration.   
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